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looks with some suspicion upon the attempts of the psychologist to say anything worth while regarding primitive custom or religion, if, indeed, he even takes notice of such attempts at all." On the contrary, the majority of field anthropologists must realize that they are but blazing the way for the comparative student, and they are pleased to know that the facts which they are doing their best to obtain from our rapidly disappearing primitive races are being utilized by the comparative student. One suggestion might be offered in conclusion, however, and that is that more use be made of mythic material recorded among these various races than of the general conclusions of anthropologists themselves, which are, of course, second hand and may sometimes be unduly biased in favor of this or that pet theory.

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An Outline of Logic. BOYD HENRY BODE. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1910. Pp. x + 324.

The author regards logic as training in reasoning and in clear thinking generally (Preface, p. v); accordingly, he lays most stress on those parts of logical doctrine which will show the student how to draw correct conclusions and to avoid fallacies. Ambiguity, a chief source of error, is treated thoroughly and practically; the traditional discussion of the syllogism is abridged; circumstantial evidence is assigned a place of importance; and the recognized inductive methods are somewhat rearranged, with a view to distinguishing proof of causal connections from that of merely universal connections. The author believes—and we think rightly—that the applications of logic in science have been too exclusively emphasized in the past (Preface, p. v) to the neglect of its applications in every-day opinion about matters of practical interest; hence most of his illustrations are drawn from current political and social questions. Yet he does not glide too lightly over the deeper issues concerning the nature of thought, of proof, of the test of truth, which are bound to appear in the course of the work. The concreteness and admirable clearness of his exposition are combined to an unusual extent with thoroughness of thinking and fairness to opposing doctrines.

As a working definition of reasoning he adopts in the introductory chapter the following: "reasoning or inference occurs whenever we assert something to be true on the ground that something else is true. When the reasoning is intended to convince some one else of the truth of the assertion, it is usually called argument" (p. 2). The final definition accepted is given in Chapter XIV., "The Nature of Reasoning," and is that of Professor James: "the substitution of parts and their implications or consequences for wholes," wherein "the part that is substituted for the whole is the point of resemblance or difference" (p. 216). At bottom, differences in reasoning ability exist because "men differ enormously in their sensitiveness to resemblances and differences" (p. 226) and "in the

power to break up . . . subject-matter into its different parts or elements" (*ibid.*). Logic is defined in Chapter I as "the *science of proof or evidence*" (p. 4). The elements of which reasoning is built up, concepts, judgments, classes, terms, are simply defined, with two sections at the end of the chapter showing the fundamental importance of classification for our thought about things, and the difficulties of such classification.

In Chapter II., on "Classification and Class Names," we begin to open our eyes to the fact that one of our chief sources of fallacious thinking lies in the difficulty of knowing and stating just wherein the members of classes *do* resemble one another. This is none other than the old enemy of the thinker, ambiguity of terms. What, for example, is common to all cases of *religion*, *capital*, or *labor*? Ambiguity is always purposive, to be sure, and so is vagueness. "So long as the term serves the purpose for which it is intended, the vagueness may not matter a great deal" (p. 18): hence we can and do use without danger many terms which we could not define clearly. Yet Professor Bode succeeds in making the reader feel, by the force of excellent examples which can not be enumerated here, that a very large part of men's disagreements and uncertainties on practical matters are due to their not defining their terms for the purpose in hand. Chapter III., on "Ambiguity and Definition," carries the subject further. Ambiguity is distinguished from vagueness, which latter may not always work evil: ambiguity is "the neglect of distinctions in the meaning of terms, when these distinctions are important for the given occasion" (p. 30), while "vagueness may be unimportant" (p. 29). Perhaps this distinction may strike the reader as arbitrary, but at any rate the treatment of ambiguity itself is excellent. The traditional rules of definition are cut down to the "genus-differentia" rule, which is rightly treated as often useless, and the rule against synonyms. A criticism occurs to us here, might not the other rules be easily shown to be of value? Chapter IV., on "Some Special Forms of Ambiguity," enumerates three main fallacies: accident, relative terms, and abstract terms. The first includes both the direct and the converse fallacy,—which seems wise. There is no difference in principle between them, and less memorizing is involved than in the current scheme. On the whole, he makes accident to mean that "sweeping statements must not be taken too seriously" (p. 40). This is good, but why does he say that this fallacy is committed "not by the person who makes the statement, but by the one who construes it" (p. 38)? The fallacy of relative terms is one which overlooks, *e. g.*, that "what is wealth for one person is not necessarily such for another" (p. 45). It is perhaps a matter of personal preference, whether or no we should regard this as different from accident; at any rate it is a frequent and important source of confusion. The fallacy of abstract terms, however, seems more doubtful. Is there any realm of thought, outside of philosophy itself, where this works harm? Or if there is any such realm, is it not really another kind of fallacy? Appeals to the cause of "progress" or "humanity" (p. 49 gives the

former case) to justify an act are surely better classed as accident or question-begging. Why give a new name when the old will suffice? And, moreover, abstract principles are too effective and useful, as appeals to human thought and emotion, to be ruled out of our common thinking—provided we recognize their sweeping character.

Chapter V. takes up the subject of propositions. Conversion is rendered more intelligible than usual to the beginner. The author regards the converse, obverse, and contrapositive, not as "immediate inferences," but as different ways of stating one and the same judgment. False obversion—an almost irresistible lure to the student—is carefully guarded against by a painstaking analysis (pp. 60–61). The syllogism is treated, avowedly in bare outline, in Chapters VI. and VII. We think some practise in the moods and in proving the rules about particular premises might well have been given the student: it can easily be made clear and is the best kind of training in exact thinking. The two main uses of the syllogism seem to the author to be, to lead us to interpret our sentences correctly (p. 92) and to acquaint us with the structure of complete arguments, by laying bare hidden premises (p. 92). We think there is also a third use: training of a semi-mathematical nature, in exactness of proof. A little more of this might have been imported without making the student forget the concrete applicability of logic as a whole.

Chapter VIII., on "False Assumption or Begging the Question," gives but two classes of fallacy: circular reasoning and irrelevancy. It does seem a little artificial to bring the latter under the head of question-begging. Surely the old classifications were better here. Only two of the "*argumenta ad . . .*" are mentioned; the *ad hominem* and the *ad populum*. The appeal to ignorance, to reverence, and the others seem to us important enough to deserve separate mention. But the discussion so far as it goes is, we must admit, more concrete and practically useful than in most of our logic text-books.

Induction is treated in Chapter IX., on the "Proof of Universal Connections," and Chapter X., on the "Proof of Causal Connections." The method of agreement is adapted only to the former; that of difference, with its group-form, the joint method, and its exact quantitative form, that of concomitant variations, to the latter. We would suggest, however, that universal connections are almost always based on causal ones. Is it then practically worth while to make this distinction? Does it bring out any better the lack of strict cogency in agreement, to mark it off thus? One feels that such an innovation in an elementary text-book should be justified not merely by its logical soundness, but by its usefulness in getting the student to apply the methods. Moreover, the method of residues is so very common—*e. g.*, in criminal investigations—that in spite of its negative character it seems to deserve notice (see Preface, p. vi). The inadequacy of inductive proofs is strengthened by appeal to the principle of "reasonable doubt" (pp. 117 and 166); this we regard as an excellent way of putting the old law of parsimony (*cf.* p. 190, foot-note), which connects the latter with present-day legal usage and shows its practical bearings.

Indeed, the author uses this principle as a common foundation for the subject of inductive proof and of circumstantial evidence. After a brief discussion of probability in Chapter XI., he introduces the important topic of circumstantial evidence in Chapter XII. This is one of the best chapters in the book. It shows that the ultimate test of truth is *convergence of evidence* (pp. 186, 198), which later on, in Chapter XIII., on "Observation and Memory," is shown to reduce to *coherence*. "Coherence of facts is our standard of truth" (p. 210). To this must be added the rule that "we regard them [our perceptions and memories] as presumably true in the absence of reasons to the contrary" (p. 212), and we have as the result the twofold test of truth which underlies all reasoning, whether deductive, inductive, or circumstantial.

Space forbids more than a mention of Chapter XIV., on the "Nature of Reasoning"—a fine psychological analysis—Chapter XV., on the "Authority of the Test of Truth"—a refutation of ultimate scepticism—and Chapter XVI., on the "Problem of Sense-Perception," designed to interest the student in the philosophic problem of knowledge. At the end of the book is a rich collection of examples.

Perhaps the novelty of the classifications of fallacies and inductive is; the author's clear style, moderate tone, careful thought, and power of making a difficult subject concrete, practical, and interesting, seem to us almost unexcelled.

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The Moral Life, a Study in Genetic Ethics. Volume I. of the Library of Genetic Science and Philosophy (Psychological Review Publications). ARTHUR ERNEST DAVIES. Baltimore: Review Publishing Co. 1909.

The members of a civilized community, according to Professor Davies, may be divided, from the point of view of the moralist, into two classes. One includes those who have—in kind, at least—the same clear conception of the ends proposed by the moral ideal which the well-instructed moralist himself possesses. The conduct of these men, in so far as they do right, is determined with explicit reference to this ideal; they alone are truly free; they alone possess—in the moral sphere, at any rate—what the author calls "individuality," or originality. The other class, which includes the great majority, have no conception of the relation of moral action to the ideal. Their morality is due to the fact that "the community works upon the subject" in such a way that "his reactions are mechanized in conformity to a common type." Such persons acquire the approved ways through imitation, and both acquire and maintain them, in great part, for "the pleasure which one has in doing things which others are doing." The factor which must be added to these actions if they are to be regarded by the agent as *moral*, is a consciousness of social approbation. This, in its turn, of course provides a new motive for action. The members of this class, as blindly imitative, have, in our author's terminology—by which he seems to set much store—mere "personality."